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NOTES
tection to varying and inconsistent standards depending on the
motives or purposes behind the particular statute. Not only is
it difficult to determine the sole motivation behind a legislative
enactment, but it is also futile to judicially attempt to invalidate
the law because of improper legislative motives. Presumably,
the law could be re-enacted for valid motives and, thus, become
constitutional.61 However, if the Court continues to rely upon
the effects of the statute, the standard will remain constant and
judicial inquiry will be limited to an area within its proper
bounds.
W. Michael Adams
FEDERAL TAX LIABILITY OF THE WIFE FOR COMMUNITY
INCOME EARNED BY THE HUSBAND
Mr. and Mrs. Mitchell lived under Louisiana's community
of gains from 1946 until its termination by judicial separation
from bed and board in August 1961. Later, Mrs. Mitchell re-
nounced the community of gains leaving Mr. Mitchell responsible
for all assets and liabilities contracted during the existence of
the community. Although he earned taxable income from 1955
to 1959, Mr. Mitchell failed to file federal tax returns. In an
attempt to collect one-half of the taxes and penalties owed on
this income, the Commissioner assessed a deficiency1 against
Mrs. Mitchell. The Tax Court 2 determined that Mrs. Mitchell's
tax liability was created when she became owner of the property,
and that she has become the immediate owner of one-half of all
community property upon its acquisition. The Fifth Circuits
reversed, holding that Mrs. Mitchell's renunciation avoided any
tax liability on income falling into the community of gains. On
into one composite legislative motive is at once absurd, irresponsible, and
scientifically indefensible. It amounts to sclentism of the worst variety."
Howell, Legislative Motive and Legislative Purpose in the Invalidation of a
Civil Rights Statute, 47 VA. L. REV. 439, 450-51 (1961).
61. Bee note 36 supra.
1. A deficiency is the excess of a given tax over the net amount previous-
lyreported and assessed or collected without assessment. INT. REV. CODE of
1954, § 6211. Deficiencies are formally asserted by the government through
an assessment. An assessment occurs when the district director signs the
assessment list, and this fixes the government's tax claim. Mim. 3229, 111-2
CUM. BULL. 293, 294 (1924).
2. Mitchell v. Commissioner, 51 T.C. 641 (1969).
3. Mitchell v. Commissioner, 430 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1970).
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appeal the United States Supreme Court 4 reaffirmed the Tax
Court's decision and held that under existing Louisiana law, Mrs.
Mitchell had an immediate ownership interest in all community
property at its acquisition. Therefore, she was personally liable
for federal taxes on her one-half interest in this income. Her sub-
sequent renunciation under state law did not affect her liability
as federal law exclusively determines exemptions from federal
taxation. United States v. Mitchell, 91 S. Ct. 1763 (1971).
Mrs. Mitchell's liability in the instant case was based upon
the nature of the wife's interest in community property. The
two major characterizations of the wife's interest have been
either that of "ownership" or of "expectancy." 5 Under the
expectancy theory, the wife's interest was viewed as a mere
hope which materializes into absolute ownership only at the
termination of the community of gains.6 There seems to be
support for this concept in both the Civil Code and the Code of
Civil Procedure. Article 2404 of the Civil Code7 gives the hus-
band control over community property. The corresponding ar-
ticle of the Digest of 1808 based the husband's control on the
fact that "she [the wife] has no sort of right in them [com-
munity assets] until her husband is dead."8 Did the omission of
this phrase from the Civil Codes of 1825 and 1870 give the wife
more than a mere hope, or did it only reopen the question of
the wife's interest? The idea that the wife continues to enjoy
only a mere hope is supported by article 686 of the Code of
Civil Procedure,9 which makes the husband the proper party in
a suit involving community property. Furthermore, article 695
of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that the wife may sue
only "as the agent of her husband ... to enforce a right of...
the marital community" when "specially authorized to do so by
4. United States v. Mitchell, 91 S. Ct. 1763 (1971).
5. Comment, 25 LA. L. REV. 159, 160 (1964).
6. Ramsey v. Beck, 151 La. 190, 91 So. 674 (1922); Jacob v. Falgoust,
150 La. 21, 90 So. 426 (1922); Succession of McCloskey, 144 La. 438, 80 So.
650 (1919); Succession of Emonot, 109 La. 359, 33 So. 368 (1902); Smith v.
Reddick, 42 La. Ann. 1055 (1890); Tugwell v. Tugwell, 32 La. Ann. 848 (1880);
Succession of McLean, 12 La. Ann. 222 (1857); Guice v. Lawrence, 2 La. Ann.
226 (1847).
7. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2404: "The husband is the head and master of the
community of gains; he administers its effects, disposes of the revenues
which they produce, and may alienate them by an onerous title, without
the consent ... of his wife .... "
8. La. Digest of 1808, bk. III, tit. V, art. 66.
9. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 686: "The husband is the proper plaintiff, during
the existence of the marital community, to sue to enforce a right of the
community . .. ."
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her husband." Additionally, the wife is not provided with an
action against the husband for an accounting during the exis-
tence of the community of gains.'0 Article 2410 of the Civil Code
allows the wife the privilege of exonerating herself from liability
to pay debts contracted during the marriage by renouncing the
community of gains." Clearly then, there is strong legislative
support for the expectancy interest theory; the legislation seems
to be contrary to the idea that the wife owns one-half of the
community property.12
Very little direct support is found in the Civil Code to indi-
cate that the wife owns one-half of the community property at
its acquisition. Article 2399 of the Civil Code,'3 cited in support
of the ownership theory, equates the community of gains with
a partnership. However, Civil Code article 2807,14 found in the
title treating partnerships, expressly states that the community
of gains is not a partnership. Since the Louisiana Supreme
Court has interpreted article 2334 of the Civil Code as directing
that the earnings of the wife are to be included in community
property,3 it is claimed that inequity would result from a hold-
ing that she has a mere expectancy interest. Thus, the lack of
sound legislative support has forced the Louisiana Supreme
Court to base the ownership theory on the restrictions placed
upon the husband in his management of community property.16
The ownership theory of the wife's interest was first ex-
pressed by the Louisiana Supreme Court in 1832.1 However,
10. LA. R.S. 9:291 (Supp. 1963). See Azar v. Azar, 239 La. 941, 120 So.2d
485 (1960), where the court rejected any possibility of the wife suing the
husband during the existence of the community of gains because of his
fraudulent acts, but allowed her to sue for a separation of property.
11. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2410: "Both the wife and her heirs or assigns have
the privilege of being able to exonerate themselves from the debts con-
tracted during the marriage, by renouncing the partnership or community
of gains."
12. Comment, 25 LA. L. Rsv. 159, 163-67 (1964).
13. LA. Crv. CODE art. 2399: "Every marriage contracted in this State,
superinduces of right partnership or community of acquets or gains . .. ."
See Messersmith v. Messersmith, 229 La. 495, 86 So.2d 169 (1956); Succession
of Wiener, 203 La. 649, 14 So.2d 475 (1943); Dixon v. Dixon's Executors, 4
La. 188 (1832).
14. Id. art. 2807: "The community of property, created by marriage Is
not a partnership .... "
15. Houghton v. Hall, 177 La. 237, 148 So. 37 (1933).
16. Azar v. Azar, 239 La. 941, 120 So.2d 485 (1960); Messersmith v. Messer-
smith, 229 La. 495, 86 So.2d 169 (1956); Succession of Hells, 226 La. 133, 75
So.2d 221 (1954); Phillips v. Phillips, 160 La. 813, 107 So. 584 (1926); Dixon v.
Dixon's Executors, 4 La. 188 (1832).
17. Dixon v. Dixon's Executors, 4 La. 188 (1832).
1972]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
fifteen years later the court reversed itself in Guice v. Lawe-
rence1s and held that the wife's interest in community property
was a mere expectancy that became full ownership only at the
end of the community. This position prevailed for more than
seventy-five years, until the Louisiana Supreme Court in Phillips
v. Phillips' repudiated the expectancy theory of Guice. The
court stressed, by way of dictum, that the wife's interest in
community property was one of full ownership of an undivided
one-half, extant immediately upon acquisition of the property.
This dictum has been heavily re-enforced since 1926 by both
the United States and Louisiana Supreme Courts.2
The stress placed upon the ownership theory in Phillips must
be examined in light of the parallel legal developments in the
field of federal income taxation at that time. In United States V.
Robbins21 the United States Supreme Court decided that a wife
was not entitled to report one-half the community income on
her federal tax return because, under California law, the wife's
interest in community property was a mere expectancy. Thus
the privilege of allowing each spouse in a community property
state to report separately one-half of the combined income was
abolished.22 This method of reporting income had resulted in
a lower tax rate, and thus a lower amount of tax due, than if
the income were reported by the acquiring spouse only. Since
Louisiana law at this time heavily favored the expectancy theory,
it appeared that Louisiana spouses would lose this benefit.28 In
the Louisiana test case of Bender v. Pfaff,24 argued ten months
after the Phillips decision, the United States Supreme Court
cited Phillips as authority for the proposition that "the decisions
18. 2 La. Ann. 226 (1847).
19. 160 La. 813, 825, 107 So. 584, 588 (1926): "The wife's half interest in
the community property is not a mere expectancy during the marriage; it
is not transmitted to her by or in consequence of a dissolution of the com-
munity. The title for half of the community property is vested in the wife
the moment it is acquired by the community . . . ." But see H. DAGGETT,
THE COMMUNITY PROPERTY SYSTEM OF LOUISIANA 151 (1945).
20. Fernandez v. Wiener, 326 U.S. 340 (1945); Bender v. Pfaff, 282 U.S.
127 (1930); United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Green, 252 La. 227, 210
So.2d 328 (1968); Gebbia v. City of New Orleans, 249 La. 409, 187 So.2d 423
(1966); Azar v. Azar, 239 La. 941, 120 So.2d 485 (1960); Succession of Wiener,
203 La. 649, 14 So.2d 475 (1943); Phillips v. Phillips, 160 La. 813, 107 So. 584
(1926); Dixon v. Dixon's Executors, 4 La- 188 (1832).
21. 269 U.S. 315 (1926).
22. O.D. 426, 2 CUM. BULL. 198 (1920); T.D. 3071, 3 CuM. BULL. 221 (1920);
T.D. 3138, 4 CUM. BULL. 238 (1921); Treas. Reg. § 62-31 (1921).
23. R. MACILL, TAXABLE INCOME 308 (rev. ed. 1945).
24. 282 U.S. 127 (1930).
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of the Supreme Court of Louisiana clearly recognize the wife's
ownership of one-half of all the community income."25 Poe v.
Seaborn,26 a 1930 Supreme Court case, held that the federal in-
come tax was levied upon the net income of every individual,
with the state's designation of ownership of income determining
tax liability. Thus, the Louisiana Supreme Court's dictum in
Phillips became the basis for allowing Louisiana residents a tax
rate lower than that borne by residents of the forty non-com-
munity property states.27
The decisions in Poe and Bender were the foundation for the
Mitchell holding. The rationale was that since the Louisiana
wife had an immediate ownership interest in community prop-
erty (income), she was responsible personally for the income
tax due on her portion of that income. There are two broad
bases for criticizing the foundation of Mitchell. First, use of the
state's determination of ownership of income has not been re-
sorted to in other taxation areas. Rather, the United States
Supreme Court determines federal tax liability on the basis of
control over the income or property.28 Second, the wife's interest
in the community of gains is not adequately described by either
the words "ownership" or "expectancy."29 It is submitted, there-
fore, that neither of these doctrines announced earlier should
be considered applicable in this situation.
Justice Holmes in United States v. Robbins" expressed the
idea that the husband's control over community property was
sufficient to make him alone liable for taxes upon community
property. The United States Supreme Court refused to apply
this reasoning in Poe. The Court's refusal to apply the rationale
of Robbins should be re-examined since, "[i]n the light of other
decisions, the general test of taxability under the federal revenue
act would appear to be economic control rather than the tech-
nical ownership . . . here emphasized."81 In a 1930 opinion the
25. Id. at 131.
26. 282 U.S. 101 (1930).
27. The Revenue Act of 1948 allowed the filing of a joint return by a
husband and wife, thus removing this inequality between spouses of different
states. See B. BITTKER, FEDERAL INCOME, ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION 282-88
(1958).
28. R. PAUL, SELECTED STUDIES IN FEDERAL TAXATION 41 (2d series 1938).
29. See note 43 infra.
30. 269 U.S. 315, 327 (1926). "This was . . . probably the main ground of
the Robbins case." R. MAGILL, TAXABLE INCOME 309 (rev. ed. 1945).




United States Supreme Court stated that "taxation is not so
much concerned with the refinements of title as it is with actual
command over the property taxed,"8 2 and held the income of a
revocable trust taxable to the settlor. Subsequently, the settlor
of a trust who had retained control was held liable to be taxed
for the income received by the trust even though he neither
received benefits under the trust nor had technical ownership
of it. s8
In Lucas v. Earl,84 involving the assignment of earnings
which state law assumed to be valid, the Court stressed the fact
that the Revenue Code taxes salaries to those who earned them,8
a tax liability which "could not be escaped by anticipatory
arrangements . . . however skilfully devised to prevent the
salary when paid from vesting even for a second in the man
who earned it."'  No satisfactory reason was found for distin-
guishing between assignment by private agreement as in Lucas
v. Earl and assignment by operation of law 87 as in Bender v.
Pfaff.8 The Court's holding in Lucas has since been upheld in
several cases involving family partnerships. 9 In these situations
where the other members of the partnership were non-contribu-
ting members of the husband's immediate family, he was held
liable for all the taxes in spite of valid state partnership agree-
ments; attempting to escape this liability through a corporate
structure would not succeed either.40 The idea of control as the
basis for determining tax liability finds further support in Hel-
vering v. Horst,41 wherein the Court held the power to dispose
of income to be the equivalent of ownership of it. Thus, the
pattern of decisions in the income tax field illustrates that the
United States Supreme Court has recognized the taxing power
of Congress as not being limited by concepts of ownership under
state law.42
32. Corliss v. Bowers, 281 U.S. 376, 378 (1930).
33. See Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331 (1940). This position has been
codified since 1954. See INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §§ 671-678.
34. 281 U.S. 111 (1930).
35. Id. at 114.
36. Id. at 115.
37. R. PAUL, SELECTED STUDIES & FEDERAL TAXATION 41, n.93 (2d series 1938).
38. 282 U.S. 127 (1930).
39. Lusthaus v. Commissioner, 327 U.S. 293 (1946); Commissioner v.
Tower, 327 U.S. 280 (1946); Burnet v. Leininger, 285 U.S. 136 (1932).
40. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §§ 541-547.
41. 311 U. S. 112 (1940).
42. Winstead, Aftermath of the Herbst and Wiener Decisions, 24 Tex.
L. Rev. 439, 445 (1946).
[Vol. 32
NOTES
The characterization of the wife's interest in community
property as one of "ownership" or "expectancy" is incomplete,
as these words do not adequately describe the true nature of the
wife's interests.43 In the Spanish community of gains, after
which the Louisiana community of gains is patterned, the wife
has an incomplete ownership interest in community property.
"The word commonly used by the Spanish writers to
describe the common interest of the husband and wife ...
was dominio .... In addition to this the husband held dueno
de todos during marriage which implied control or manage-
ment; whereas the wife did not become duena until the mar-
riage was dissolved. Dominio ... is seen, therefore, to be a
minimum form of ownership, not necessarily complete in
itself."44
The wife's position in Louisiana is strikingly similar. The role
of the husband is that of "head and master of the.., community
of gains."45 He has practically absolute control over community
property since his acts are binding upon such property.46 The
wife lacks the power to acquire assets or liabilities which would
become community property and, therefore, binding on her and
her husband, unless authorized by her husband.47
A determination that the wife's interest is one of ownership,
making her liable for taxes upon one-half the community prop-
erty, ignores the realities of the situation.4 It is unjustified in
43. G. MCKAY, COMMUNITY PROPERTY § 1184 (2d ed. 1925); R. PAUL, TAXATION
IN THE UNITED STATES 494-95 (1954); Bruton, The Taxation of Family Income,
41 YALE L.J. 1172, 1173 (1932): "This 'vested interest' argument was based
upon the common law theory of ownership embodied in the conception of
legal title. It was a theory which was inept and inadequate to describe
community property relations which were developed under an alien juris-
prudence. It had no real connection with the tax problem involved which
should have been approached from the standpoint of the taxpayer's actual
relation to the income for which he was taxed." See also Comment, 25 LA.
L. REV. 159, 186 (1964).
44. Pugh, The Spanish Community of Gains in 1808: Sociedad de Ganan-
Males, 30 LA. L. REV. 1, 12, n.77 (1969).
45. LA. CtV. CODE art. 2404.
46. Comment, 25 LA. L. REV. 514, 517 (1964), and cases cited therein.
47. Id. at 529 and cases cited therein.
48. See Daggett, The Modern Problem of the Nature of the Wife's
Interest in Community Property-A Comparative Study, 19 CALIF. L. REV.
567, 600 (1931); R. PAUL, TAXATION IN THE UNITED STATES 495 (1954): "[T]he
Supreme Court chose to recognize this formal separate ownership of the
wife, both for income and real estate purposes, and to ignore the realities
of economic control in the husband . . . although like distinctions between
vested and contingent remainders failed to save taxpayers in other areas
of tax law," citing Helvering v. Hallock, 209 U.S. 106 (1940). H. HADEN,
FUNDAMENTALS OF FEDERAL TAXATION 77-93 (1959).
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light of United States Supreme Court determinations that control
over the the property subjects one to tax liabilities arising from
this property. The only suggestion by the Supreme Court of
relief for the good faith spouse was an appeal to the legislature.
Under a recent amendment to the Internal Revenue Code,49 the
good faith spouse may not be liable for taxes due as a result of
filing a joint return.5 0 For the good faith spouse to obtain relief
under this law, a joint return must have been filed and other
requirements met. This relief would not be available if no re-
turns were filed, as was the case in Mitchell, or if the husband
filed a separate return reporting only one-half of the total income.
Since the Court's position regarding the wife's liability was quite
firmly put forth, it is suggested that the above legislation be
expanded to protect the good faith spouse in future Mitchell-
type situations which may arise.51
Warner H. Anthony, Jr.
LIMITATIONS ON THE EFFECT OF THE EXPRESS OFFSET CLAUSE
AND A SUGGESTED DUTY TO UNITIZE
Plaintiff landowners executed a mineral lease with defen-
dant lessee, which also owned the lease on the adjoining tract.
The lease contained a provision obligating the lessee to drill
offset wells when producing wells were located on adjoining
tracts within 150 feet of the leased premises, should the drilling
of such wells prove to be economically feasible. Upon plaintiff's
allegation of drainage of the leased premises through the defen-
dant's operations on adjoining premises, defendant contended
that it had not been put in default and that, in any event, its
obligation to protect against drainage was limited by the express
offset clause. The federal district court,' sitting as an Erie court,2
and basing its decision on what it perceived to be the applicable
49. 84 Stat. 2063 (1971), amending INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §§ 6013(e),
6653(b).
50. See Emory, New Law Afleviates Innocent Spouse--Joint Return
Problem on Omitted Income, 34 J. TAXATION 154 (1971).
51. It has been suggested that a concept of mismanagement of com-
munity property similar to theft, INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 165, be applied to
absolve the innocent wife of liability, Note, 49 TEX. L. REV. 562, 567 (1971).
1. Federal jurisdiction was based on diversity of citizenship, according
to 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1970).
2. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). The "Erie Doctrine"
basically requires that federal courts apply the law of the forum state In
cases not involving a federal question.
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